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Abstract 
 
  The United States Government requires every program manager in the 
Department of Defense to document program goals prior to the initiation of an 
acquisition program. According to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (2005), an 
Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) satisfies this requirement. The APB describes the 
program goals through a list of objectives and thresholds for the cost, schedule and 
technical performance parameters. Updating the APB, also referred to as re-baselining, 
may also be required during the execution of an acquisition program. Although guidance 
is available for the initial production of a program baseline, scarce information on the 
guidance and theoretical purpose of a program re-baseline exists. The research presented 
in this thesis investigated the purpose and effectiveness of program re-baselines through 
interviews with twenty seven program managers from the acquisition community. An 
analysis of the data collected during the interviews, combined with an extensive review 
of the current literature, led to recommendations in the areas of improved guidance, 
practice and education. Specifically, it was revealed that the purpose of a re-baseline 
varies depending on an individuals past experiences with a re-baseline activity. In 
addition, this research revealed that a majority of program managers have participated in 
a program re-baseline during their careers, which magnifies the importance of clarifying 
the expectations and objectives of program re-baselines for those entering the acquisition 
profession. 
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Acquisition Program Re-baselines:  Theory & Practice 
I. Introduction 
Background 
In the past, the government has made an attempt to acquire weapon systems faster 
and cheaper with increased capabilities.  This is evident by the reform initiatives 
launched by the government with respect to the acquisition management process.  Studies 
have been conducted on the effect government acquisition reform initiatives such as the 
Packard Commission and the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) have made 
on the acquisition process (Searle, 1997).  Research has shown that while these initiatives 
were aimed at reducing cost overruns and schedule delays, little change has been noticed 
to the amounts of overruns and delays incurred by defense weapon system acquisitions 
(Searle, 1997, Drezner et al, 1993).  In fact, one report shows that reform initiatives, 
which impacted 197 programs studied, did not reduce cost growth (Searle, 1997, Drezner 
et al, 1993).   
Meanwhile, with the increased cost, schedule, and performance comes greater 
scrutiny and attention from Congress.  The United States Government has required that 
the Department of Defense (DoD) comply with Title 10, Sections 2435 and 2220 of the 
US Code Title 10, which require every program manager to document program goals 
prior to program initiation, Milestone B.  According to Chapter 2.1.1 of the Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook (2005), an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) satisfies this 
requirement.  The APB describes the programs goals through a list containing objectives 
and thresholds for each cost, schedule, and technical performance parameter.  For cost 
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thresholds and objectives, the best available estimates are used, while schedule and 
technical performance parameters are defined with the help from the user community.  
 The Defense Acquisition Management Framework consists of five phases.  The 
phases are listed in sequential order:  Concept Refinement, Technology Development, 
Development and Demonstration, Production and Deployment, and Operations and 
Support (DoDI 5000.2, 2003).  When the DoD decides to award a development and 
production contract to a defense contractor, this also indicates the start of a program 
office for that particular system.  This is Milestone B and it signifies the point in time 
when a Program Manager (PM) takes over the management of the program.  After 
Milestone B, the development and demonstration phase begins.  During this acquisition 
phase, quarterly and/or annual reviews occur to assess the current risks, shortfalls, and 
successes of each program with their respective Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) or 
Program Executive Officer (PEO), depending on the ACAT (Acquisition Category) level 
of a program.  The ACAT level is determined by the dollar value and MDA special 
interest (DoDI 5000.2, 2003).  Programs range from ACAT level I to level III with 
ACAT level I having the largest dollar value.  For larger programs and programs with 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or Congressional special interest oversight, 
information is provided through reviews in a Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs).  
Since 1975, Congress has mandated the information contained in the SARs be supplied to 
Congress for review (GAO-05-182, 2005).  The intent of a SAR is to provide OSD and 
Congress with adequate information about each program’s status to allow decision 
makers to make informed funding determinations.  For smaller programs, the MDA, or 
PEO, receives similar information on their respective programs.  With respect to ACAT I 
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or special oversight programs, a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 
indicates that SARs could provide “more complete, timely and accessible information” 
(GAO-05-182, 2005).  One issue within this report discusses the problems with reporting 
program re-baselining.  A program re-baseline can occur for various reasons: when 
entering a new acquisition phase; when technical requirements need refinement; when 
restructuring; when experiencing cost overrun or schedule delay beyond thresholds in the 
APB; and finally, when a violation of the Nunn-McCurdy unit breach cost occurs (GAO-
05-182, March 2005).  Although much guidance is available for the initial production of 
a program baseline, scarce information on the guidance and theoretical purpose of a 
program re-baseline exists.  This research effort will attempt to define and clarify the 
objectives of a program re-baseline. 
It is likely that a majority of the experienced re-baselines will occur during the 
development phase.  Research has shown that at a minimum, 45% of projects were re-
baselined at least twice during the development phase (McNutt, pg 293, 1998).  This case 
study will explore the theory and guidance that currently exists for re-baselining a 
program as it compares to current practice.  This will determine if program re-baselining 
is producing the results originally intended for an Air Force weapon system acquisition 
program as prescribed by theory and guidance.  Specifically, this research will attempt to 
determine if the practice of re-baselining an Air Force system acquisition program meets 
its intended purpose as prescribed by theory and guidance.  There are three phases in 
which a baseline can occur:  the technology development, development and 
demonstration, or production and deployment phase.   This research will focus on the 
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guidance and theory versus the practice of re-baselines with no preference to the 
acquisition phase.     
Scope and Methodology 
 The process for this study will follow steps described by experts such as Yin 
(2003) and Creswell (1994, 1997). An exploratory case study approach was chosen 
because very little evidence exists on prior research involving program re-baselines.  The 
evidence found is a report on program re-baselines by the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) which describes some of the issues involving the communication of a 
program’s status.  This study’s primary focus was on program managers from a single 
Air Force Product Center.  Secondary sources include individuals with acquisition 
experience at an adjacent organization.  It should be noted that although participants will 
only be selected from the two organizations, the experience of each program manager 
will stretch across the entire Air Force acquisition community involving programs from 
all Air Force Product Centers.   
This research effort will primarily consist of two forms of data.  The first is 
historical literature on the history of program re-baselines and also on the current 
guidance provided to acquisition personnel relating to the re-baseline process.  The 
second source of data will come in the form of interview responses.  After selecting the 
organizations for this case study, a group of program managers from a single Product 
Center will be asked to participate in an interview which will be used to answer the 
investigative questions by triangulating with the historical data. 
As Yin recommends, the initial data analysis will consist of detailed descriptions 
that will help the researchers gain familiarity with data (Yin, 2003).  Throughout this 
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study, a search for any conflicting or similar literature will be performed to build internal 
and external validity.  Analysis will include evaluating literature on the history, theory 
and guidance of program re-baselines and compare these evaluations to the responses 
gathered from the interviews.  Another aspect of analysis will compare the theory and 
guidance versus the current practice of program re-baselines.  
Preview 
 The following study will determine if the purpose and effectiveness of program 
re-baselines in practice match the theory.  The next step involved a thorough literature 
review to find the history of re-baselines as well as the theoretical objective of the re-
baseline process.  Following the literature review, the methodology and research design 
will be discussed.  After collecting the data, the analysis step clarified the views and 
perceptions program managers have towards the re-baseline process.  Finally, the last 
section answers the research question and provides recommendations for improving the 
re-baseline process. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
Background 
 This research effort will focus on comparing the theory and guidance versus the 
current practice of the program re-baseline process and purpose.  By examining relevant 
literature and while defining the theory and guidance related to acquisition program re-
baselines, this chapter will familiarize the reader with program re-baselines and their role 
in the overall acquisition of a weapon system within the Department of Defense (DoD).  
Though the review reveals that a lack of guidance and understanding of the purpose and 
effectiveness of program re-baselines exists within the DoD, it will explore applicable 
statutes, directives, instructions, and guidance to help form a basis for the research 
questions.  Literature will provide a description of the current issues facing acquisition 
programs and the role program re-baselining plays in those circumstances.  The chapter 
then concludes with familiarization material pertaining to the methodology chosen for 
this exploratory study. 
Introduction to Defense Acquisition Programs  
 According to the Defense Acquisition University, the acquisition system is in 
place to provide a secure and sustainable military to support our national strategies 
(IDAM, 2001).  The framework for defense acquisition leadership determines the phases 
that a typical program progresses through.  At the end of each phase, a program direction 
decision must be made (GAO-05-182).   
The acquisition process starts with a need identified by users in the field.  This 
need can arise from a capability gap in our current arsenal, a new technology that may 
increase our effectiveness on the battlefield, or a new threat.  A set of capabilities to 
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address the identified need are defined.    A number of panels review the capabilities to 
determine which are the most urgent and/or necessary. The chosen capabilities are then 
published in the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD).  After an Analysis of Alternatives 
(AoA) is performed and the industry has been consulted, a determination is made to 
either look for a non-material solution to meet the capabilities gap or request proposals to 
enter into the development phase of the weapon system program.  This phase will 
produce another capability document called the Capability Development Document 
(CDD) which, along with an updated performance section, will also have a financial and 
schedule strategy that shows “a military useful and supportable operational 
capability…can be effectively developed, produced or acquired, deployed and sustained.” 
(CJCSI 3170.01E, 2005) It is during this time that the initial Acquisition Program 
Baseline (APB) is produced.  A source selection will be conducted to evaluate the 
competing contractor’s proposals and make a selection to the contractor that proposes the 
best value relating to the cost, schedule and technical feasibility of the weapon system.  
This is called Milestone B, and is also the time when a program office is formed.  At 
Milestone B, the APB is approved.  The final capability document called the Capability 
Production Document (CPD) is approved at the end of the Development and 
Demonstration phase.  This is called Milestone C and is also when the MDA determines 
if the program is ready to move into the Production and Deployment phase. 
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History of Baselines 
 Programs within the DoD have historically been filled with new or never been 
accomplished before technology.  This has led to difficult risk assessments and 
inaccurate cost estimates, which have led to cost overruns and schedule growth for 
defense programs.  Since the warfighter needs the technology, and a new start would 
mean increased funding for the program, it was usually too late in the process to simply 
cancel a program.  As a result, the continued decision to either cut production units or 
increase funding for the program has been the norm.  These programs stayed alive 
because the technology was needed and a new start wasn’t a viable option.  In the 1950’s, 
the DoD understood that the complexity of weapon systems development and their 
corresponding contracts required a more involved and elaborate management system than 
the standard system used in industry.  Tools such as PERT, the Program Evaluation and 
Review Technique, used by the Navy in the 1960’s and then the Cost/Schedule Control 
System Criteria (C/SCSC) developed by the Air Force and later implemented by OSD in 
1967 in the DoDI 7000.2, labeled the “Performance Measurement for Selected 
Acquisitions” began to put pressure on the DoD to change the management system.  This 
pressure led to all services, and industry, working with a single standard for management 
criteria, C/SCSC.  These criteria enabled the use of an integrated management technique 
for managers called Earned Value Management or EVM  (Abba, 2000). 
 Earned Value was first introduced by industrial engineers more than one hundred 
years ago (Fleming & Koppelman, 1999).  Only after some time of refining their initial 
efforts did these engineers realize that relating earned standards against the actual hours 
provided the true cost performance.  Today’s use of earned value is based on the work of 
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these pioneers.  This concept was first used by the Air Force’s Minuteman Missile 
Program during the 1960s (Fleming & Koppelman, 1999).   In 1996, this technique was 
termed the Earned Value Management System (EVMS) with a few small changes to the 
criteria from the C/SCSC technique (Fleming & Koppelman, 1999).  EVM is defined as a 
system that allows a manager to monitor the progress of a program with details of the 
integrated cost, schedule, and performance parameters by relating resource planning to 
cost and schedule requirements (DACS GP-28 V 1.2, 2004).  Within the EVM concept, 
the idea of a baseline was born.  One of the plans, the Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled 
(BCWS), is the time-specific budget for an effort.  The BCWS is also known as a 
baseline that allows managers to predict cost and schedule variances and estimates of 
completion.  These predictions and estimates can help managers see problems with cost, 
schedule or technical performance progress before they get out of control (DACS GP-28 
V 1.2, 2004).   
 During the time that EVM started to emerge as the leading managerial technique 
for major defense weapon systems, the Government began research on the cost, schedule, 
and performance problems related to these programs.  In 1986, the Packard Commission 
discussed the lack of stability for major weapon systems as an important concern and 
gave two recommendations for combating the instability.  The first recommendation 
involved the use of multi-year funding for procurement.  More importantly, the second 
recommendation stated a need to require and implement a baseline for all programs at the 
start of the development phase (Packard Commission, 1986).  Also in 1986, statutes were 
passed with baseline requirements (10 USC 2435).   
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Congressional Guidance 
As part of the United States Code:  Title 10:  Subtitle A:  Part IV:  Chapter 144:  
Section 2435 (10 USC 2435):  the baseline description states the Secretary of Defense 
(SecDef) will determine the appropriate baseline descriptions for each program that 
includes the cost, schedule, and performance parameters (10 USC 2435) . This assures 
Congress that their large investments in today’s weapon systems are adequately 
determined to be supportable financially, technically and politically, while providing our 
services with the equipment necessary to maintain the top military in the world.  Also 
included under the baseline description is the clear direction that without an approved 
acquisition baseline, after the system enters the Development and Demonstration phase, 
no amount of appropriated funds will be obligated (10 USC 2435).  Similar verbiage is 
provided when describing the schedule for such programs before entering the production 
and deployment phase.  The statute also mandates that the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) 
will determine the regulations with respect to reporting deviations from the approved 
baseline with regard to cost, schedule, performance and supportability of the program.  It 
also gives the SecDef the power to determine the “Procedures for review of such 
deviation reports with the DoD…procedures for submission to, and approval by, the 
SecDef of revised baseline descriptions” (10 USC 2435).  This section of the statute is 
self explanatory and should describe to the reader the highest level of baseline 
requirements and regulation.   
Congress also gets involved with major weapon system programs.  Since 1975, a 
Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) has provided Congress with annual updates on a 
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program’s cost, schedule, and technical performance status (GAO-05-182).  This enables 
a more informed decision for Congress when the program’s future is determined. 
Department of Defense Guidance 
According to section 3.7.2.5, Entrance Criteria, of the DoD Instruction 5000.2 
(2005) all programs will have an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) providing 
objectives and thresholds for the cost, schedule, and performance parameters throughout 
its life cycle.  This is in reference to the specific entrance criteria required for an 
acquisition program to move to the next phase of the program.  The Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook (DAG) mentions that an APB serves as the document that allows the DoD to 
comply with 10 USC 2435.  The DAG serves as a complimentary document to further 
clarify and explain the acquisition process and DoD directives, regulations and 
instructions.  The DAG also states that the role of producing the APB lies with the 
program manager who, with help from his team and the user community, determines the 
baseline performance and schedule requirements along with best estimates of total cost 
equal to projected funding.  For program managers, Air Force guidance on baselines 
refers to DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 5000.2. 
Department of Defense Baseline Theory 
 Although numerous reports and documents exist that explain and define 
managerial concepts such as C/SCSC and EVMS, an accurate and consistent definition or 
theory for defense systems acquisition baselines is scarce.  The best definition of a 
baseline used for managing defense programs is “a quantity or quality used as a starting 
point for subsequent efforts and progress measurement to include cost, schedule and 
performance baselines.”  (DSMC Fact Sheet, 1997)  The Defense Systems Management 
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College (DSMC) fact sheet also agrees with the DoD Directive 5000.1 that in theory 
“program baseline parameters shall serve as control objectives” (DoDD 5000.1, May 
2003). 
Introduction to Acquisition Program Re-baselines 
 A program re-baseline is defined as the process that occurs in the event the PM 
revises the APB due to restructuring or unrecoverable deviations, otherwise known as a 
parameter breach.  The purpose of a re-baseline is to regain control of a program with an 
updated APB based on changes to the cost, schedule, or performance parameters.  A re-
baseline is also needed for the milestone decision authority to make key decisions about 
the program’s future.  If a breach occurs, the MDA is required to conduct a complete 
program evaluation and determine if alternative concepts or designs would better serve 
the needs of the warfighter (DAG, 2004).  A recent GAO report reaffirms the re-baseline 
definition stating that changes to the baseline are due to: a breach in one or more 
parameter thresholds, phase changes, or restructuring (GAO-05-182).  The thresholds 
were established in the original APB.   In most cases, the decision to re-baseline occurs at 
annual reviews which evaluate current and future risks, rising cost, schedule and 
technical performance trade-offs, and the defining of exit criteria.  Another notable 
reason to re-baseline occurs when a program exceeds unit cost thresholds called the 
Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach (GAO-05-182).   
The investigator has yet to find guidance and instruction that explain how a 
program should be re-baselined.  However, determining precisely when re-baselining a 
program should occur is briefly explained in the DAG.  The guidance states that a 
Program Manager is required to immediately notify the MDA if any thresholds in the 
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APB are breached.  There is a timeline of thirty days for notifying the MDA of the reason 
for the breach and ninety days for a program to be back within APB parameters or a 
change only in the breached parameters (DAG; 487, 2004).   
What’s wrong with the Current Acquisition Process 
 The Department of Defense has spent significant amounts of time and energy 
trying to discover the cause of, and finding solutions to, the cost overruns, major 
schedule delays, and technical performance flaws prevalent in current weapon system 
acquisitions.  Research efforts by civilian and military groups have been unable to 
discover the exact cause of the issues mentioned above.  In a study by Drezner et al. 
(1993), it was discovered that reform initiatives failed in reducing cost overruns from 
1960 to 1990.  A similar study using a different data set found that over an 8-year period, 
1988 through 1995, Air Force managed major weapon system contracts experienced an 
increase in cost overruns (Searle, 1997).  Poor cost estimation was determined to be a 
consistent factor of poor cost performance for each study.  Searle (1997) said it best when 
he stated “despite the implementation of more than two dozen regulatory and 
administration initiatives, there has been no substantial improvement in the cost 
performance of defense programs for more than 30 years.”    Although continued 
research is currently looking into solving the problems above, no clear answer has been 
offered. 
While several research efforts focus on finding a cause for cost overruns, schedule 
delays and performance shortfalls, this study will investigate the theory and guidance 
versus the current practice of the program re-baseline process and purpose of using the 
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re-baseline tool to adjust program goals so they can accurately reflect current program 
situations.   
Baseline Concerns Outside The Department of Defense 
 Although a majority of program scrutiny occurs on major defense systems, other 
sectors of the U.S. government are dealing with programmatic issues relating to re-
baselines, in particular the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).  A National Airspace 
System (NAS) Configuration and Evaluation Staff found: 
While the FAA has undertaken a significant number of program re-
baseline actions in the past two years, the process for modifying baselines 
has not been consistently applied.  Agency guidance related to the re-
baseline process, including the documentation required for these actions, 
is vague and incomplete.  
 
  Both recommendations are consistent with DoD guidance with respect to re-baselining a 
program due to cost, schedule, or performance threshold breaches and/or when a major 
shift in the goals or strategy occur (FAA, 2000). 
Finally, it should also be noted that if someone only focused on defense contracts 
they would not get the right perspective when compared to other government projects. 
The research conducted by Searle (1997) and Drezner et al. (1993) focused their attention 
strictly on DoD contracts.  Although defense acquisition programs witness cost overruns 
and schedule delays, this phenomena is not uncommon. But according to one report, most 
DoD projects witness cost overruns that are lower than the norm for government 
contracts (Reig, 1995).   
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III. Methodology 
Overview 
To help gather and organize this study, procedural steps from Creswell (1994) 
and Yin (2003) were reviewed.  Little evidence has been discovered of past research in 
the area of program re-baselines.  Based on the evidence discussed above, an exploratory 
qualitative approach using a case study as the design was determined to be the 
appropriate technique. This approach allows a researcher the flexibility to choose from 
several sources of data used for the purpose of discovering themes, trends, and provide 
documentation to a subject lacking previous research to explain a process or 
environment.  There are two sections that will be described in this chapter; the research 
method and the qualitative research design.  Each section will include a detailed 
description on the selection process and procedures experienced in this research effort.  
As stated by Yin and Creswell, no defined methodology exists for every qualitative 
research effort (Creswell, 1994, Yin, 2003).  With that thought in mind, this effort will 
use a hybrid research method and design approach based on the recommendations of 
both. 
Selection of Research Method 
 
 The basis for the research method chosen is derived from the recommendations 
by Creswell and Yin (Creswell, 1994, Yin, 2003).  The first step is to determine a focus 
statement or question that can direct the study.  For this study, the focus research 
question asks: 
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Does the practice of re-baselining an Air Force acquisition program meet its intended 
purpose as prescribed by theory and guidance? 
 
The lack of a specific theoretical background or previous research on re-baselines, as 
shown in chapter two, along with a need to explore the phenomena led to the qualitative 
paradigm approach as deemed best for this study.   
The key assumptions for this qualitative study are: the processes, as well as the 
outcome, are the primary concerns; the research is inductive in nature as concepts and 
hypotheses will be constructed; and the biases and beliefs of the researcher have a 
positive effect (Locke et al, 1987, Creswell 1994). 
Qualitative Research Design 
 Based on a qualitative paradigm, Creswell recommends using a case study to 
explore a single process or phenomenon that has bounds (Creswell, 1994). The bounds in 
this study center on the program re-baseline process.  Yin also describes the use of a case 
study approach that will explore phenomenon in real situations and context that contains 
boundaries that are not clear (Yin, 2003).  This is very apparent in the re-baseline process 
as no strict or clear guidance exists for this process.  After the qualitative approach was 
finalized, the type of case study design was chosen.   
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With questions such as how and why the re-baseline process takes place, the type of 
case study chosen will be an exploratory one.   The investigative questions for this study 
are: 
1. What is the theory behind re-baselining a program? 
2. What guidance exists to aid Program Managers through the re-baseline process? 
3. Is a program re-baseline effort effective? 
The research question attempts to define the current practice of re-baselining a 
program and determine the effectiveness based on the views and opinions of those in the 
acquisition community.  The next component of defining the case study design relates to 
the basic issue of determining what the case actually is.  With the process and purpose of 
program re-baselining forming the focus, a single case study approach was determined to 
best match this study.  After choosing a single case study approach, the unit of analysis 
was chosen as the acquisition program re-baseline process within the Air Force.  This 
decision is consistent with the research and investigative questions.  However, as Yin 
mentions it was difficult to set bounds for the unit of analysis due to several variations in 
each acquisition program (Yin, 2003).  These variations will help generalize the re-
baseline process research.  It should also be mentioned that with the lack of literature 
pertaining to this research effort, the definition of the case and unit of analysis has no 
basis on past research.  The fourth step, logic linking the data to the propositions, is 
derived from the interview questions and their direct relevance to the problem statement 
and research questions.  Due to the imprecise and undefined strategies for analyzing data, 
this study will base the criteria for interpreting the results on the theoretical problem 
statements and research questions. 
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An important step in the research involves analysis of the data.  Before this step can 
occur, the types of data desired and the tools used for data collection were chosen.  
According to Creswell (1994), no one tries to randomly select subjects in a qualitative 
study.  By purposefully selecting individuals that can answer your questions the best, the 
research is not randomly selecting research subjects (Creswell, 1994).  He also 
recommends researchers consider four parameters:  where the research will be conducted; 
who will be interviewed; what participants will be interviewed about; and the process 
undertaken by the participants (Creswell, 1994).  The research will be conducted at the 
offices of the individuals participating in this study.  The individuals selected will be 
from the Program Management (PM) functional career field.  The subjects will be 
questioned about the process and purpose of re-baselining an acquisition program.  
Because the research will gather views and opinions from individuals at one place in 
time, the researcher acknowledges that the views and opinions will change as the 
participants experience the re-baseline process in the future.   
Next, the type of data collection tool was determined.  With their ability to provide 
information on a process, interviews were chosen as the best tool for collecting data from 
the program managers (PMs) on the program re-baseline process.  The purpose of the 
interview is to gather the opinions and views of the interviewees.  With this purpose in 
mind, Creswell and Yin recommend using an open-ended or semi-structured interview 
approach (Creswell, 1994, Yin, 2003).  This approach allows a researcher to gather 
insight and opinions on the subject matter and possibly offer other interviewee candidates 
and sources of evidence (Yin, 2003).  
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For this research effort, interviewees were chosen from PMs within a single Product 
Center and from an adjacent unit.  Permission to conduct interviews was granted from the 
Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Internal Review Board and a representative of 
civilian government employees.  The questions asked to the interviewees are provided in 
the Table 1.  
Table 1.  Interview Questions 
   Question 
Re-baseline 
Questions 
1. Have you ever been involved with the re-baseline of an 
acquisition program in the development phase? 
 
2. In your own words, can you describe the program re-baseline 
process? 
 
3. Can you describe the existing guidance for a program that 
wants to pursue the program re-baseline process?  
 
4. In theory, what is the objective of re-baselining a program? 
 5. What do you consider a successful program re-baseline? 
 6. Do you see any causes for programs having to re-baseline? 
 7. In your opinion, does the re-baseline effort serve its purpose and is it effective? 
 
8. In your opinion, do the results for re-baselining a program 
justify the effort involved in the re-baseline? 
 
9. Can you list any issues or problems you may have with the 
program re-baseline purpose and process? 
 
10. Do you have any recommendations on ways or techniques to 
improve the program re-baseline process? 
 
11. Do you believe re-baselining a program is voluntary? 
Demographics 12. What is your functional position? 
 
13. How long have you been working in the acquisition 
community? 
  
14. Can you give any recommendations for other individuals who 
I should interview? 
 
The participants in this study were selected based on available contact 
information and functional position.  The first step involved contacting either the 
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executive positions or human resource representatives within each organization.  
Through this step, lists of PMs within each organization were provided for the purpose of 
requesting volunteers for this particular research effort.  Each participant was asked to 
volunteer for the study through email and given a brief explanation of the purpose and 
confidentiality.  Over the course of the study, individuals scheduled in-person interviews.  
The researcher transcribed the opinions and exact thoughts of the interviewees 
throughout each interview.  To limit biased transcriptions by the researcher, each 
interviewee was given the opportunity to review the transcriptions to ensure an accurate 
account of the interview.  Once the data collection for each interview was complete, the 
entire transcripts were then processed into the spreadsheet for future analysis and theme 
building.  Colleagues were asked to confirm the themes and patterns developed by the 
researcher as a sanity check and to ensure an accurate account of data analysis occurred.  
The themes and patterns that emerged throughout the data analysis process are described 
below in detail for each individual interview question and their corresponding research 
question. 
Data Analysis 
 Although variations can exist for data analysis, Creswell recommends a four step 
process (Creswell, 1997, Pitet, 2004).  This spiral approach provides the most appropriate 
process to achieve desirable results.  The interview data was processed through the 
following steps:  
1. Data Organization:  The data was organized using a database.  Then the large 
responses were broken into smaller phrases or single words. 
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2. Perusal:  Gather an understanding of the big picture concepts in the transcripts 
from the interviews.  Then choose an interview and dissect its contents to 
determine the meaning underlying the substance.   
3. Classification:  After finding the inner meaning for numerous interviews, make a 
list of themes or topics and try to combine the similar topics.  Patterns should 
begin to emerge during this step. 
4. Synthesis:  Combine and organize the data.  Produce hypotheses or propositions 
that answer the research questions.  Finally, build tables, diagrams, etc. to 
describe proposed relationships.  
During data analysis, two techniques as recommended by Yin and Creswell will 
also be used (Creswell, 1994, Yin 2003).  Pattern matching is accomplished by 
comparing the results of the four step process described above, and finding patterns that 
can be predicted from theory or guidance.  Another technique for data analysis is termed 
explanation building.  In this technique, the researcher tries to find links or explanations, 
either plausible or rival, and attempts to build a good explanation for the case.  With the 
limited guidance and attempt to build theories, the analysis will focus primarily on 
building explanations and secondarily on finding patterns predicted from theory and 
guidance.  After analyzing the data, the next step is trying to verify the research.  
Creswell discusses the need for a qualitative study to have a plan that addresses the 
validity and reliability (Creswell, 1994).   
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Other Considerations 
 Although generalization, or external validity, is not a concern for this exploratory 
study, reliability and other validities will be addresses.  Construct validity is best 
accomplished by establishing an operational set of measures.  One technique 
recommends building construct validity by having colleagues and advisors review the 
report in its draft form during the data collection phase (Yin, 2003).  Internal validity is 
addressed with the feedback process for transcribed interviews.  This technique allows an 
interviewee a chance to ensure his/her answers were recorded accurately by the 
researcher (Merriam et al, 1988, Creswell, 1994).  Even though this study cannot be 
precisely replicated, a very descriptive approach for data collection can enable this 
qualitative case study to be replicated at another Product Center or the Navy and Army 
(Creswell, 1994).  However, a goal of case studies to establish reliability involves 
minimizing errors (Yin, 2003).  In an attempt to increase reliability, the researcher has 
completely documented all procedures and processes for this study. 
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IV. Data Analysis 
 
Overview 
This chapter illustrates the analysis of the research effort.  The chapter will be 
organized into two sections: 
1. The demographics collected for this study, and 
2. The results and analysis of data collection and the linking of responses to a 
specific research question. 
The purpose of this research effort has three distinct objectives:  identify the 
theory and clarify the guidance of program re-baselines, determine if individuals within 
the acquisition career field believe the program re-baseline process is effective, and 
finally, recommend any actions that will better serve program manager’s relating to the 
re-baseline process.  This chapter will discuss the views and opinions of program 
managers (PMs) and relate them to the investigative questions.   
Demographics 
The PMs held a variety of positions that consisted of Air Force Officers and Air 
Force government civilians.  The time in the acquisition career filed ranged from 3 years 
up to thirty years.  The varying degree of experience and expertise produced a large 
scope of data.  The majority of participants, 78%, had worked on a program while going 
through the re-baseline process.  This demonstrates the experience and credibility for 
each participant’s responses.  For the purposes of this study, categorizing and describing 
the various levels of PM positions would not provide additional insight to the research 
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effort and therefore was purposely left out.  Confidentiality was maintained by the lack of 
demographic information requested during the interview process. 
Data Analysis 
 This section will be broken into four parts corresponding to each investigative 
question and the interview questions relating to each.  To help illustrate the analysis, a 
table for each interview question is provided. 
Investigative Question #1: What is the theory behind re-baselining a program? 
Questions four and five of the interviews provide responses that directly answer 
the first investigative question.  For clarity, the analysis will be divided by the analysis 
for each interview question.  
Interview Question #4. In theory, what is the objective of re-baselining a program? 
For this question, two main themes were identified by participants.   Expectation 
management as the objective for re-baselining a program was mentioned in 55% of the 
responses.  Expectation management was described as the complete buy-in and 
understanding by all program stakeholders with respect to the program’s current or 
updated situation.  Today, a new requirement for PMs is the development and buy-in 
from the user community through the Expectation Management Agreement (EMA).  This 
agreement is essentially an extension of the acquisition program baseline (APB) and 
serves as an avenue to declare and communicate expectations of all stakeholders through-
out the life-cycle of the program.  When the program witnesses a breach of one of the 
parameters, cost, schedule, or performance, a re-baseline enables the program office to 
communicate the changes and necessary change in management direction to the 
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stakeholders with an updated baseline and EMA, otherwise known as a program re-
baseline.   
An objective identified by 51% of the participants is to ensure the new program 
baseline is realistic and executable based on new funding, schedule, and requirements 
parameters.  This response is consistent with the description in the DoD 5000 series.  As 
mentioned above, when changes in one or more of the program’s three parameters, cost, 
schedule, and performance occur, the old baseline does not match the current situation 
with respect to funding changes, schedule delays, and requirement changes.  An 
executable baseline is one that enables a PM to perform or carry out what is expected of 
him as documented in the APB.  The re-baseline process should help identify the 
problems and develop a “get well” plan with new cost estimates, schedules, and 
requirements definitions that give the PMs a realistic and executable program baseline to 
manage under these new constraints. 
Two minor themes emerged and essentially both objectives share the same 
intentions; stabilize the program and provide a tool to bring the program’s status back to 
green.  The stabilization of the program response by interviewees was not considered 
similar to the development of an executable program baseline response because the 
purpose of stabilizing a program does not necessarily involve producing a realistic 
baseline.  Stabilizing the baseline only ensures positive reporting up the chain of 
command, and alleviating a need to re-baseline in the near future, and may not include 
realistic and executable cost, schedule, and performance constraints.  The ability to bring 
all cost and schedule variances back to zero indicates that the program is on track and no 
breach has occurred.  As with the stabilization of a baseline, the resetting of cost and 
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schedule variances allows managers to report a program’s status as positive using the 
new baseline in the EVMS management tool.   
Table 2 will present the data for the responses each participant gave 
corresponding to a theme.  Due to the openness of the interview questions, several 
participants provided a response that corresponds to more than a single theme.  Each 
theme mentioned by a participant was weighted equally thus providing results totaling 
more than 100%.   
Themes # of responses % of participants Total # of 
participants
1: Expectation Management 15 55.56% 27
2: Build a realistic & executable baseline 14 51.85% 27
3: Stabilize the program 4 14.81% 27
4: Bring program status back to green 4 14.81% 27
Table 2.  What is the theoretical objective of a program re-baseline?
 
Interview Question #5.  What do you consider a successful program re-baseline? 
 When interviewees were asked what a successful re-baseline effort meant to 
them, three themes emerged.    A majority, 63%, identified a successful program re-
baseline as an effort that produces a new, executable baseline within the updated cost, 
schedule and performance constraints.  Creating and receiving stakeholder buy-in for the 
new baseline parameters was identified by 37% of the program managers interviewed.  
This correlates to producing an EMA with a clear understanding of the program’s future 
direction.  The least identified theme for a successful re-baseline effort was creating a 
stable baseline.  As mentioned above, the definition of a stable baseline for this study 
does not necessarily mean the creation of an executable baseline.  A response of 
stabilizing the program simply states the desire to not go through the re-baseline process 
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for two or more years, as defined by interviewees, and a desire to have a positive 
reporting status to leadership.  Table 3 below illustrates the breakout of the analysis. 
Themes # of responses % of participants Total # of 
participants
1: Created a realistic & executable baseline 17 62.96% 27
2: Created stakeholder approval and buy-in 10 37.04% 27
3: Created a stable program 5 18.52% 27
Table 3. What is considered a successful program re-baseline?
 
Investigative Question #2:  What is the existing guidance for program re-baselines? 
 This investigative question will help determine if existing re-baseline guidance is 
known and utilized by program managers.  The responses to interview question three will 
be analyzed and recommendations for the policy makers will follow in chapter five. 
Interview Question #3:  Can you describe the guidance for program managers who want 
to pursue the re-baseline process?  
When asked, more than half of the participants declared they were not aware of 
any guidance and used a common sense approach for the re-baseline process.  They then 
defined this approach as a number of steps generally involving:  the identification of the 
cause for re-baselining; working with the user, higher level headquarters, and the 
contractor to develop a “get well” plan consisting of new budget estimates, schedules, 
and requirements definitions; and finally coordinate and receive buy-in from the decision 
authorities as well as the user community.  Another 42% of the program managers 
described the guidance as stated in the DoD 5000 series as their main source of re-
baseline direction.  There were two other responses given during the interview as one PM 
stated that MAJCOM specific guidance was used when re-baselining a program and 
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another mentioned EVMS guidance.    Table 4 illustrates the results of analysis for 
interview question three. 
Themes # of responses % of participants Total # of 
participants
1: No. Used a common sense approach 15 57.69% 26
2: Followed DoD 5000 series guidance 11 42.31% 26
3: Followed other guidance 2 7.69% 26
Table 4.  Describe any program re-baseline guidance
 
Investigative Question #3:  Is re-baselining a program effective? 
 The two interview questions that determined the effectiveness, based on the views 
of  program managers, asked if the re-baseline effort served was effective, as well as if 
the effort involved in re-baselining a program was justified with the outcomes the process 
produced.   
 Interview Question #7: In your opinion, does the re-baseline effort serve its purpose and 
is it effective?  
For the first question, an overwhelming response of all but one of the twenty 
seven participants thought the outcome of the re-baseline process did serve its purpose 
and was effective.  Almost half also went on to state that it was effective at getting all the 
program stakeholders on the same page with the new direction and APB.  A few program 
managers mentioned the effort to re-baseline a program was only effective if the cause of 
the APB breach was identified and a get well plan helped stabilize the program after the 
approval of the new APB by the MDA.  The single participant who provided the “no” 
response described the frustrations encountered throughout the process and the results.  
This individual had to go through the re-baseline process a year after the first re-baseline, 
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thus building a negative view of the effectiveness of the re-baseline process.  Table 5 
illustrates the results for interview question seven. 
Table 5.  Is the program re-baseline process effective?
Themes # of responses % of participants Total # of 
participants
1: Yes 26 96.30% 27
    1a: Effective at getting stakeholder buy-in 10 37.04% 27
    1b: If program's stable 3 11.11% 27
    1c: Not sure about the purpose it serves 1 3.70% 27
    1d: If original baseline is remembered 1 3.70% 27
2: No 1 3.70% 27
 
Interview Question #8:  In your opinion, do the results for re-baselining a program justify 
the effort involved? 
 When the PM and their decision authorities determine a program re-baseline is 
the best solution for an out of control program, they understand the amount of effort and 
resources involved.  For major acquisition systems, ACAT I programs, this can mean 
months or even years of continuous briefings and buy-in from stakeholders regardless of 
a particular stakeholder’s stake in the program.  A result is the lack of management 
attention devoted to the program’s current issues while working though the re-baseline 
process.  For smaller programs, the same percentages of resources may be exhausted, but 
the timeline usually doesn’t reach those major programs.  With this thought in mind, the 
PMs were asked if they felt the effort involved in re-baselining a program was justified 
with the outcomes the process produced.  Over 90% of the participants believed the effort 
was justified based on the outcome of the re-baseline process.  One individual had 
mentioned the negative experience while working on a certain program re-baseline effort 
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and felt the resources were not adequate and external people should be hired to help 
manage a program during the re-baseline process. The program manager also mentioned 
the lack of stakeholder buy-in after the process and felt the effort involved was not 
justified based on the results. Another PM felt that the effort involved may or may not be 
justified, depending on the success of the re-baseline process.  Table 6 breaks down the 
analysis for interview question eight. 
Themes # of responses % of participants Total # of 
participants
1: Yes 24 92.31% 26
2: No 1 3.85% 26
3: Both, depending on the situation 1 3.85% 26
Table 6.  Does the outcome of the re-baseline process justify the effort?
 
Additional Program Re-baseline Research 
 The remainder of this chapter will analyze data collected for the interest of the 
researcher to gain a better understanding of the process and build recommendations for 
program managers and their management of a program during the re-baseline process. 
Supplemental Question #1:  What causes a program to re-baseline? 
 While future research will identify the exact causes of programs that re-baseline, 
interview question six asked program managers to list any cause of a program re-baseline 
they have witnessed.   
Interview Question #6:  Do you see any causes for programs that have to re-baseline?  
Almost half of the participants identified broad causes of a re-baseline and others 
gave a more specific reason.  Most program managers listed more than one reason they 
believed caused a program to re-baseline.  The typical causes described by 48% of the 
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participants include cost overruns, schedule delays, and/or a change in performance 
requirements.  Any one of these issues caused a parameter breach in the APB and thus 
caused the need to re-baseline.  Roughly 19% of the program managers believed defense 
contractors caused the need to re-baseline based on three situations:  the defense 
contractors proposed a low price to ensure being awarded the contract; overly optimistic 
defense contractor management that led to low contract proposals; and the inability of 
defense contractors to perform as agreed upon and expected by the government.  Several 
program managers, 17%, described factors external to their control during their tenure as 
the PM, but controllable by the DoD, as the cause for a re-baseline effort.  These factors 
include:  funding instability or cuts; late government furnished equipment (GFE) for use 
on another program; and finally, reliance on other programs with relation to integration 
issues.  It is widely known that due to the nature of our budget process, and the lack of 
control of world events, leadership from time to time must re-align funding and this 
usually leads to programs losing or gaining funds and the need to re-baseline based on 
budgetary changes.  Late GFE and the reliance on other programs can also cause a 
program to delay its schedule.  These situations are clearly out of the PMs control and a 
new baseline may be needed to communicate the program’s current situation and way 
ahead.  Also, during the process leading up to contract award, the government attempts to 
build reliable and accurate cost estimates.   
Almost 8% of the participants felt poor government cost estimates caused the 
program to re-baseline.  When technologies required for the system are not proven and 
program managers may not be able to predict future events, program managers believe 
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these initial cost estimates as another cause for program re-baselines due to the eventual 
breach of the cost parameters.  Table 7 illustrates the analysis for interview question six. 
Table 7.  In your experience, what caused a program to re-baseline?
Themes # of responses % of participants Total # of 
participants
1: Cost, schedule, & performance breaches 21 80.77% 26
2: Defense Contractor Issues 11 42.31% 26
3: Factors out of PMs control 9 34.62% 26
4: Poor cost estimates 5 19.23% 26
5: Poor understanding of requirements 5 19.23% 26  
Supplemental Question #2:  Are there problems relating to the re-baseline process? 
 This interview question attempts to shed light on concerns program managers 
have with issues relating to the re-baseline process.  All but six participants described at 
least one concern with respect to the re-baseline process.  As expected, several issues 
came to light.   
Interview Question #9.  Can you list any issues relating to the re-baseline process? 
The most commonly mentioned concern, at 25%, is the lack of guidance and 
examples of a good re-baseline documentation package for program managers.     
However, several did mention there are no issues with the process and they also 
appreciate the flexibility when developing the re-baseline package for review by 
leadership and the user community.  Program managers also voiced their concern 
regarding flexibility with respect to the timeline and resources available during the 
process.  Currently a PM has ninety days to develop the get well plan once the breach has 
occurred.  There are no exceptions, but also no repercussions if this timeline is not met.  
A program manager is expected to continue the normal management duties of the 
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program during the re-baseline process, but this process usually involves the use of 
resources not intended for the re-baseline effort.  Some program managers were 
concerned that their inability to freeze the program and devote all their resources to the 
re-baseline effort limited the timeliness of the effort and accuracy of the cost and 
schedule estimates.  The PMs believed the misunderstanding of other stakeholders about 
the re-baseline process caused the need to freeze a program during this process.  Another 
concern voiced by PMs was the lack of education relating to the re-baseline process.  
They felt the need for an overview of the purpose and expectations during acquisition 
education would help with the uncertainties that arise during the process and would also 
clarify the situation the program office is put in to other stakeholders. 
The last concern  program managers have with the re-baseline process was the 
negative stigma that usually comes with the re-baselining of a program.  It is commonly 
known that certain communities outside of the program feel program managers are 
simply trying to hide their mistakes by re-baselining a program and putting the status 
documentation back in the green for reporting purposes.  This stigma usually stays with a 
program for some time and can produce negative feelings and/or poor communication 
channels between the program office and other stakeholders.  Below, Table 8 presents the 
analysis of interview question nine.   
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Table 8.  Are there issues relating to the re-baseline process?
Themes # of responses % of participants Total # of 
participants
1: Lack of guidance and examples 7 25.93% 27
2: None 6 22.22% 27
3: More accountability and control for PMs 4 14.81% 27
4: Cannot freeze program during re-baseline 4 14.81% 27
5: Attempting to get stakeholder buy-in 3 11.11% 27
6: Stigma that re-baselining hides problems 3 11.11% 27
7: Other 3 11.11% 27
 
Supplemental Question #3:  Are there any recommendations for improving the re-
baseline process? 
 After voicing their issues with the re-baseline process, the participants 
were then asked to identify any recommendations they had that could improve the re-
baseline process.  Of the twenty seven program managers interviewed, 3 did not provide 
a response to this question.  Below is the list of recommendations for improving the re-
baseline process. 
Interview Question #10:  Do you have any recommendations on ways or techniques to 
improve the re-baseline process? 
The main theme coming from interview question ten involves the 
recommendation that more guidance and a repository of successful re-baseline 
documentation should be made available to PMs either on a defense acquisition website 
or other means.  Many participants voiced their frustration with the lack of broad 
guidance and expectations placed on them during the re-baseline process.  The second 
most identified theme was the importance of changing the negative stigma of re-
baselining a program.  PMs felt this had to start at the top with leadership and flow down 
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into the lower ranks of the acquisition community.  Another common theme voiced from 
the participants was their advice for all program managers to keep full and open 
communications with all stakeholders, especially the user representatives and higher 
level headquarters, during the buy-in portion of the re-baseline process.  They believed 
this increased coordination would help speed along the process and give all stakeholders 
a clear understanding of the get well plan.  Another theme mentioned was that program 
managers should keep the original baseline in mind during the re-baseline process; thus 
giving all stakeholders a better understanding of the initial intent of the program and a 
better understanding for the program’s future.  Although the recommendation to include 
re-baseline education in acquisition courses was only voiced by 3 of the participants, this 
approach could also affect other issues and recommendations as well.  The affects of 
adding re-baseline education will be discussed later in chapter 5.  
One theme developed during the data analysis process was matching the approval 
level of a re-baseline with the accountability level of a program.  This means ensuring 
that the approval for re-baselining a program should only go as high up the leadership 
chain to match that of the accountability level for that program.  Table 9 shows the 
analysis for interview question ten. 
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Table 9.  Recommendations for improving the re-baseline process
Themes # of responses % of participants Total # of 
participants
1: Add guidance and examples 11 40.74% 27
2: Change negative stigma of re-baselining 5 18.52% 27
3: Better coordination with stakeholders 3 11.11% 27
4: None 3 11.11% 27
5: Require original baseline be remembered 3 11.11% 27
6: Add education 3 11.11% 27
7: Other 2 7.41% 27
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V. Results & Recommendations 
 
Overview 
 The purpose of this research was to determine if program re-baselining was 
producing the results originally intended for an Air Force weapon system acquisition as 
prescribed by theory and guidance.  A secondary goal of this effort, make 
recommendations to improve the process, was accomplished by reflecting on data 
obtained from the interviews and the literature review.  This chapter will present 
conclusions from this research and offer recommendations for practitioners and future 
endeavors.    
Conclusion 
 The intended objective of this study was to gain an understanding of the re-
baseline process and provide recommendations for improving the process within the Air 
Force.  The secondary objective was motivation for future research into the purpose and 
effectiveness of re-baselines.  It is the researcher’s belief that both objectives were met 
and the acquisition community as a whole will greatly benefit from the findings and 
recommendations of this study. 
 The research question asked if the practice of re-baselining an Air Force 
acquisition program met its intended purpose as prescribed by theory and guidance.  The 
participants felt that a purpose was met for re-baselining a program, but, based on the 
analysis, the purpose or objective could not be identified.  The lack of a clear purpose and 
objective for program re-baselines led the researcher to make several recommendations to 
improve and clarify the process which will also clarify the desired outcomes. Based on 
this study, it has been determined that the two theoretical objectives of re-baselining a 
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program, as described by the program managers interviewed, are to manage the 
expectations of all stakeholders and produce an executable and realistic APB.   
Likewise, the research problem stated an uncertainty to the effectiveness of 
program re-baselines.  The uncertainty still exists because this study could not produce a 
clear definition to the purpose and objective of a program re-baseline.  However, as 
mentioned above, this discovery of uncertainty has led to the recommendations that 
should clarify the purpose and effectiveness of the re-baseline process. 
Along with clarifying the objective of program re-baselines, the participants 
believed more guidance is needed to aid the program managers when working through 
the re-baseline process.  The Program Managers (PM) voiced their frustration with 
spending valuable resources trying to determine what the expectations were from all the 
stakeholders during and after the re-baseline process.  Based on the analysis of the 
interviews, recommendations for practitioners have also been developed.   
Over the course of the study, it became clear that some of the interview questions 
did not directly address the research question and therefore the analysis and results for 
those questions have been left out of this study.  It is possible that future research efforts 
may find the data useful and therefore the questions, and their transcriptions, will be 
maintained. 
As stated above, this is the initial study of program re-baselines and several 
factors were not taken into account that should be explored for future research efforts.  
More program managers from different Product Centers and Services would need to be 
interviewed to build a stronger case for changing the current acquisition culture with 
respect to the program re-baseline process.  The results of this study should help improve 
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a process that in turn tries to provide a product to the warfighter as fast as possible under 
cost and schedule constraints.   
Recommendations for Practitioners 
 The following recommendations are primarily targeted towards those responsible 
for writing Air Force acquisition policy and also those responsible for conducting and 
maintaining acquisition education.  However, these are recommendations and do not infer 
that any responsible organization is doing a poor job.  The acquisition world is very 
complicated with countless laws and regulations that must be followed.  Without those 
who write the policies, and teach program managers how to manage a program within the 
policies, the Air Force would not be where it is today.  Based on the twenty seven 
interviews for this study, several key areas of improvement should be considered.  The 
recommendations for practitioners is divided into three sections:  education, guidance, 
and information dissemination. 
Recommendations for Guidance 
 Over half of the participants could not describe the guidance used when their 
programs went through the re-baseline process.  Another 36% mentioned the limited 
guidance in the two DoD 5000 series documents as their main source of guidance.  As 
discovered through the literature review, and through the data analysis of the interviews, 
it appears there is a lack of guidance with respect to program re-baselines.  This section 
will discuss the researcher’s recommendations for modifying, and adding to, the existing 
guidance.  Keep in mind that several of the PMs interviewed preferred little guidance 
compared to an abundance of guidance relating to program re-baselines.  However, a 
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majority also felt a lack of clarity and objectives exists in the current guidance 
documents.   
 The biggest issue raised during this research effort was the lack of understanding 
the objective for re-baselining a program.  The two main thoughts from the program 
managers interviewed was that re-baselining helps manage expectations between all 
stakeholders and the re-baseline process helps build a realistic and executable baseline 
based on current changes and updates.  Either Air Force or DoD level guidance needs to 
clarify the objectives for re-baselining a program.  The current guidance states that a 
baseline is used as a control objective for the program (DoDD 5000.2, 2003).  The 
researcher then inferred that the objective of a re-baseline effort is to regain control of the 
program’s baseline with a realistic and executable APB.  This added clarification will 
also help program managers understand what constitutes a successful re-baseline which 
also had conflicting responses from the interview participants. 
The second concern echoed by interviewees was the lack of clarity on the timing 
and timeliness of program re-baselines.  Guidance describes the need to re-baseline 
within 90 days of the parameter breach (DAG, 2004).  The program managers 
interviewed did not understand why a time limit that is not enforced or punishable if not 
followed is in place when the main objective of the process is to regain control of the 
program with a realistic and executable baseline.  When trying to determine the correct 
course of action and building of accurate and realistic estimates, a deadline only hampers 
the true purpose of the re-baseline process.  Several PMs mentioned the inability to 
gather all necessary information and development of the “get well” plan within the 
required 90 days.  With all this accounted for, there are three recommendations to help 
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clarify the timing of a program re-baseline.  First, policy makers need to explore the 
realistic timelines for current and past program re-baselines and modify existing guidance 
to match a more realistic deadline.  Secondly, a description of the penalties for not 
meeting the deadline needs to be added to make the program managers accountable.  
Finally, guidance should include some clarifications to the timing of a re-baseline.  
Specifically, whether a PM can begin the re-baseline process knowing a breach will 
occur in the coming months.  If a program manager takes a proactive stance and tries to 
correct the problems before they occur, this decision should be rewarded.  DoD guidance 
states that the breach must occur before the corrective actions, a new baseline, can be 
implemented.  Clarification in the guidance, either at the Air Force or DoD level, needs 
to be included.  
Recommendations for Education 
 A concurrent research effort is looking at the effectiveness of acquisition 
education while this study specifically tried to gather information that will improve the 
program re-baseline process.  After speaking with instructors at the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU), and through the data analysis, it is clear that little or no acquisition 
education involves the teaching or guidance on how a PM should re-baseline a program 
and what is expected of the PM during and after the re-baseline process.  With such a 
common occurrence, 21 out of 27 interviewed PMs having been a part of at least one 
program during the re-baseline process, it would be assumed that education is available 
to the program managers.  However, program re-baselines education would not 
necessarily mean adding another course.  There are three key areas that should be 
considered when developing re-baseline education:  program manager’s expectations; 
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desired outcome of the education; and what value does re-baseline education add.  
Program managers have expressed in the interviews that it is not clear what is expected 
of them and most used a common sense approach when re-baselining a program.  
Acquisition education needs to build upon the guidance in the DoD 5000 series, and 
DAG, by clarifying what the purpose of re-baselining a program is and what expectations 
the Milestone Decision Authorities (MDAs) and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, 
Acquisition office (SAF/AQ) have in regards to a program re-baseline.   
When asked what the objective of a re-baseline effort was, the PMs could not 
agree.  The lack of a clearly defined objective for re-baselining a program could also be a 
reason why the programs go through more than one re-baseline effort throughout the 
program’s life cycle and the process takes more resources and time than necessary.  
Education needs to reiterate the objectives of re-baselining a program to the PMs.  The 
desired outcome of the education should be the clear and defined expectations and 
responsibilities of the program manager during the re-baseline process, along with 
leadership expectations and clearly defined program objectives for the re-baseline 
process.   
Another common thought discovered during analysis was the perception of a 
negative stigma placed on program mangers from the acquisition and user communities if 
the PMs took their respective programs through the re-baseline process.  It appears that 
this stigma is due to the lack of education and communication relating to program re-
baselines since a majority of the program managers interviewed have experienced a re-
baseline during their tenure.  The perception is that a PM will decide to re-baseline in 
order to report positive status updates to the MDA and other stakeholders and not 
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because a breach or deviation occurred with one or more of the parameters in the 
Acquisition Program Baseline (APB).   
The desired outcome of including education relating to program re-baselines 
includes:  the clarification of expectations and responsibilities of the program managers 
during the process; clearly defined objectives of the re-baseline process; the gradual 
decay of the negative stigma associated with PMs who re-baseline a program; and more 
efficient re-baseline efforts with educated program managers who understand the 
expectations placed on them.  Also, a feedback mechanism should be implemented to 
help determine if the education on re-baselines gave positive support to PMs that 
encountered a re-baseline effort after the education. 
Recommendations for Information Dissemination 
The last issue raised during this research effort was the lack of consistent 
guidance with respect to documentation and expectations of the program manager during 
the re-baseline process.  Several program managers that went through a re-baseline 
process mentioned the frustration of trying to find a good template for documenting and 
reporting the parameter breach in the APB.  Instead of inserting templates and examples 
into the existing guidance, a program re-baseline repository should be developed on one 
of the defense acquisition websites.  The repository should include examples of the 
documentation, timing of events, and the re-baseline process programs went through to 
get approval of the new APB.  This could become the one stop shop for PMs trying to 
build their re-baseline package for approval briefings with stakeholders and the MDA.  
Even if this cannot be accomplished at the Air Force level, each Product Center can have 
their Acquisition Center of Excellence develop and maintain the documentation programs 
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went through during their respective re-baseline efforts.  With these recommendations, 
program managers could develop the plans for the new baseline faster and with more 
clarity than before.  This would allow the PMs to focus their efforts on the more 
important issues of the re-baseline process like new cost estimates and making trade-off 
decisions between the cost, schedule, and performance parameters. 
Limitations  
The nature of case studies involves some inherent limitations.  The three main 
limitations are:  the inability to generalize with external validity; researcher bias; and 
finally a lack of rigor with respect to other research methods if systematic procedures are 
not followed (Yin, 2003).  Another set of limitations arise from the use of interviews as a 
form of data collection.  The main interview limitation is that interviewees may try to 
give the researcher what he or she wants to hear construing the results (Yin, 2003).  
In case studies, biases occur and can produce poorly constructed questions.  Also, 
the interviewee’s response may be biased.  To combat some of the bias issues in this 
study, several steps were taken.  First, each interviewee was offered the chance to review 
the transcribed interview and make changes or corrections if needed.  Secondly, the data 
analysis step was checked for biases by having another program manager analyze the 
data separately. Finally, the advising committee also checked for rational and unbiased 
analysis and conclusion building of the study.  
Recommendations for Further Research 
  Based on the results and recommendations of this study several possible areas of 
focus are available for future research.  These other focus areas include:  conduct a 
quantitative study on the effectiveness of program re-baselines; conduct a similar study 
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within the Army, Navy and other Air Force Product Centers; explore the views defense 
contractors have relating to the re-baseline process; explore the required practice of 
MDAs evaluating other design concepts and approaches after a breach has occurred 
according to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook; distinguishing the effectiveness of a 
program re-baseline based on the ACAT level of a program and/or which acquisition 
phase the program is currently located; determine if a program re-baseline is more 
effective in a single phase of the acquisition cycle; and finally, explore the effects an 
evolutionary acquisition strategy has had on the purpose and effectiveness of the program 
re-baseline process.   
Summary 
 The purpose of this study was to determine if the current practice of re-baselining 
a program was in line with the theory and guidance for the re-baseline process.  Although 
practitioners, as a group, feel the re-baseline process is effective, they were unable to 
determine a single objective of the process.  Through the literature review and interviews, 
valuable information was found that will one day improve the re-baseline process and 
provide a base for future research into the purpose and effectiveness of re-baselines.  This 
will lead to a product for the warfighter that gets delivered faster and within the approved 
baseline.  The ability to provide our users with the best technologies and capabilities the 
world has to offer will always remain the goal of every program manager. 
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